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It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports pro-
vides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by
Huemer (1997), Olsson (2002, 2005), and Bovens and Hartmann (2003) prove
that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of
the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’
have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant
epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first
individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports
offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic inter-
pretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the
coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that
the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to co-
herence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication,
we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism
and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative
findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of
confirmation.
The idea that the coherence of a body of information provides a powerful reason
for accepting that information has a long history. Carneades appealed to coherence
reasoning in the context of medical diagnosis. Sextus Empiricus gives the following
example of Carneades’s use of coherence reasoning:
∗I am grateful to Branden Fitelson, Kevin McCain, Chis Meacham, Brad Monton, Ram Neta,
Bill Roche, Julia Staffel, and an anonymous reviewer for astute comments on this project.
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Just as some doctors detect the genuine fever patient not from one symp-
tom, such as an excessive pulse or a severe high temperature, but from a
cluster, such as a high temperature as well as pulse and soreness to the
touch and flushing and thirst and similar things, so too the Academic
makes his judgment as to the truth by a cluster of appearances.1
Alexius Meinong appeals to coherence and provides the following metaphor of
how coherence may function. “One may think of playing cards. No one of them is
capable of standing by itself, but several of them, leaned against other, can serve
to hold each other up.”2 Otto Neurath held that coherence plays a crucial role in
justifying scientific knowledge.3 Coherence reasoning is also commonplace. People
often accept or reject a claim on the basis of its coherence or lack of coherence with
a body of information.4
The possibility that coherence can increase the justification of a claim has come
under attack from results in formal epistemology known as ‘impossibility theorems’.5
These theorems aim to show (a) coherence cannot increase the probability of a claim
and (b) more coherence doesn’t imply higher probability. The first claim focuses
on the coherence of a single body of information and whether coherence can in-
crease probability, whereas the second claim focuses on two bodies of information
and whether the more coherent body of information is more probable. My goal in
this paper is to focus on the first claim proved by Huemer (1997), Olsson (2002,
2005), and Bovens and Hartmann (2003).6 For ease of discussion, I’ll focus initially
on Huemer’s result.
The discussion over coherence as a source of confirmation begins with the idea
that the coherence of multiple reports should offer positive confirmation even if the
reports individually do not offer positive confirmation. The formal results then show
that a necessary condition for coherence to offer positive confirmation is that the
reports individually offer positive confirmation. This has been interpreted to have
epistemic upshot: coherence cannot increase rational credence unless rational cre-
dence is first moved by the individual reports alone. It is this upshot that I dispute.
All the theorem shows is that a necessary condition for coherence is that the reports
1Sextus Empiricus (2005, 37).
2A. Meinong Uber Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915), p. 465.
3Neurath (1932)
4See Slaughter and Gopnik (1996); Thagard (2000); Roche (2013); Koscholke and Jekel (2016)
5For an overview see Olsson (2017)
6While there has been recent work on coherence that shows that under different conditions
coherence justification is possible (See Huemer (2011)), there is a more natural move to make in
response to the earlier results.
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are individually relevant. The theorem does not show that one’s credence must first
be moved by the individual reports in order for one’s credence to be moved by coher-
ence. One’s credence function could be such that, prior to learning that the evidence
is coherent, one’s credence is unmoved by individual reports but then, posterior to
learning the fact of that the individual reports cohere, one’s credence function is
moved by individual reports. The project of this paper is to argue for this claim and
to provide a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin with a discussion of the nature and
epistemic role of coherence which will put us in a position to see both (i) how co-
herence is thought to function in epistemology and (ii) how the formal results rely
on questionable epistemic interpretations. I then move to explain the impossibility
theorem proved by Huemer and to highlight the epistemic interpretations of result.
Third, I offer an initial defense of the power of coherence. Fourth, I consider Ols-
son’s attempt to more adequately model the effect of coherence in terms of hypotheses
about witness reliability. I then situate my approach to coherence justification within
Olsson’s witness reliability models. Finally, I expand on the progress we made in the
fourth section to provide a model of coherence justification that is consistent with
standard Bayesian approaches. These models provide a clear way to demonstrate
the possibility of coherence as a source of confirmation.
1 The nature & role of coherence
A longstanding complaint against friends of coherence is that the concept of coher-
ence is unclear. Coherence is often understood in terms of a body of information that
“fits” or “hangs together”. But what is this notion of “fit”? A.C. Ewing in 1934
channeled a common complaint against the use of coherence reasoning that apart
from a clear account of coherence, the theory is “reduced . . . to be mere uttering of
a word, coherence, . . . rob[bing] it of almost all significance.”7
C.I. Lewis in his 1946 book An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation makes
headway on clarifying the notion of coherence by proposing what has been termed the
‘witness agreement’ model of coherence.8 Lewis’s key observation is that coherence
is best seen in the case in which multiple witnesses report that the same event has
occurred. In the case in which the witnesses are independent, Lewis thinks that the
7Ewing (1934, 246)
8Lewis (1946). He also provides a formal definition of coherence. A discussion of his formal
definition is beyond the scope of this paper. See Roche (2013) for a discussion of Lewis’s definition
of coherence, among others.
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agreement of the reports provides a powerful reason to accept the report. Lewis
explains,
Imagine a number of relatively unreliable witnesses who independently
tell the same circumstantial story. For any one of these reports, taken
singly, the extent to which it confirms what is reported may be slight.
And antecedently, the probability of what is reported may also be small.
But the congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what
they agree upon.9
Lewis’s witness agreement model takes coherence to be agreement in content.
Two reports cohere with each other when they report the same event. Lewis holds
that agreement in content is epistemically powerful when (i) the reports are inde-
pendent and (ii) individually, the reports have some positive, but small, bearing on
the content of the claim. Under these conditions Lewis thinks that the coherence of
the reports can bestow a significant probability on the claim thus supported, even if
any single report has little effect.
Laurence BonJour appeals to Lewis’s witness argument model in his defense of
a coherentist account of empirical justification. BonJour aims to defend epistemic
coherentism on which coherence is the ultimate source of justification. He sees in
Lewis’s witness agreement scenario an illustration of the power of pure coherentist
reasoning. He writes,
What Lewis does not see, however, is that his own example shows quite
convincingly that no antecedent degree of warrant or credibility is re-
quired. For as long as we are confident that the reports of the various
witnesses are genuinely independent of each other, a high enough degree
of coherence among them will eventually dictate the hypothesis of truth
telling as the only available explanation of their agreement.10
BonJour posits that the positive bump in credence that any individual report
provides is not essential to the power of coherence. If the reports are independent
from one another then coherence alone provides a powerful reason to think the con-
tent is true. BonJour’s thought is twofold: (i) rational belief may not be moved by
individual testimonial reports but even so (ii) rational belief may be moved by the




Whether or not BonJour is right is a crucial question for the viability of epistemic
coherentism. Can coherence increase the justification of a body of claims without
first requiring that those claims have some justification independent of coherence?
Michael Huemer’s (1997) paper attempts to answer this question by interpreting
BonJour’s intuition as formal constraints on a probabilistic model. Let us turn to
Huemer’s theorem and its interpretation.
2 Huemer’s theorem
Michael Huemer’s (1997) paper illustrates a fruitful engagement between Bayesian
epistemology and traditional epistemology.11 Huemer interprets BonJour’s intuition
as formal constraints on a probabilistic model. He then proves that there are no
probabilistic models satisfying those constraints. This negative result is claimed to
show that BonJour’s intuition, thus formalized, is provably false. In this section I
explain this result and the conclusions that are drawn from it.
2.1 Setup
Let us begin with some terminology. Let Wi,A indicate that witness i reports A.
BonJour’s claim that the witness reports need no antecedent degree of warrant or
credibility may be understood thusly:
No Cred: P (A | Wi,A) = P (A).12
In contrast Lewis’s model assumes that the witness reports have, at least, some small
degree of credibility. That is,
Cred: P (A | Wi,A) > P (A).
In these claims, and throughout the paper, we should understand probability as
rational credence.13 (No Cred) specifies that a single witness report does not move
one’s credence. The idea is that one lacks any relevant information about whether
the witnesses report truthfully, and so for any individual report one’s credence does
not change.
11Huemer (1997)
12There’s a tacit universal quantifier ranging over witness i. This condition should be read “for
any witness i the prior probability of A is unmoved by i’s report that A.” The other conditions
below should be read similarly.
13See Maher (2006, 2010)
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The next feature of BonJour’s intuition is that the witnesses are genuinely in-
dependent of each other. If the witnesses are independent, then, BonJour thinks,
the coherence of their reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports
are true. We might attempt to capture witness independence in terms of stochastic
independence. This requires that the probability of one event does not influence
the probability of another event. Events X and Y are stochastically independent if
and only if P (X | Y ) = P (Y ). This is represented as X |= Y . Following this line,
BonJour’s idea that the witnesses are independent becomes,
Stochastic independence: Wi,A |= Wj,A =df P (Wj,A | Wi,A) = P (Wj,A).
This interpretation of witness independence rules out the possibility that there
can be evidential relationships between witness reports. It may be that one’s credence
that a second witness will report A given that a first witness reports A is higher than
one’s prior credence that the second witness reports A. This would be the case if the
individual witnesses are responsive to the truth. If my son reports that there is a
leak in the bathroom then this rationally increases my credence that my daughter
will independently report the same thing. The interpretation of independence should
not foreclose this possibility.
A better way to capture BonJour’s intuition is that the individual witness reports
are conditionally independent. This is,
Conditional Independence:
(1) P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ A) = P (Wj,A | A)
(2) P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ ¬A) = P (Wj,A | ¬A)
(1) specifies that one’s credence that j will report A is responsive to A alone;
another witness testimony is screened off by A. (2) specifies the same thing with
respect to ¬A. (1) and (2) are what we’d expect for witnesses who are causally
independent of each other.14 In the above case, my son’s and daughter’s reports
about the leak are conditionally independent in virtue of the fact that they both
track the same state of affairs.
BonJour’s intuition can then be understood as saying that under the conditions
of no individual credibility and conditional independence, the agreement of multiple
witness reports provides powerful evidence that the reports are true. That is,
BonJour’s Formal Intuition: It is possible that P (A | Wi,A ∧Wj,A) >
P (A) even if (i) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A), (ii) P (A | Wj,A) = P (A), and (ii)
the reports are conditionally independent.
14See Olsson (2002, 262) for a discussion on the reasons for conditional independence.
6
This is intended to capture the thought that the coherence of reports can provide
a reason to believe a claim even if the reports individually do not first provide such
a reason.
2.2 Huemer’s theorem
The problem with BonJour’s intuition, thus formalized, is that it is a theorem of
probability that under these conditions, the agreement of multiple reports does not
change the relevant prior probability.
Huemer’s theorem: P (A | Wi,A∧Wj,A) = P (A) when (i) P (A | Wi,A) =
P (A), (ii) P (A | Wj,A) = P (A), and the reports are conditionally inde-
pendent.
Let us briefly track through the major moves in the proof of this theorem.15
We’ve seen above that conditional independence requires these conditions
1 P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ A) = P (Wj,A | A)
2 P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ ¬A) = P (Wj,A | ¬A)
(No Cred) maintains
3 P (A | Wi,A) = P (A).
Lastly the idea that there is a coherence justification requires
4 P (A | Wi,A ∧Wj,A) > P (A).
Huemer’s theorem shows that (1)&(2)&(3) imply ¬(4).
While (No Cred) is crucial for this result, it has some surprising implications.
In effect, it specifies that any single witness testimony that A is stochastically in-
dependent from A, that is for all witnesses i Wi,A |= A. The relationship between a
witness testimony and the testified fact is like the relationship between flips of a fair
coin. So, (No Cred) implies that there is no evidential influence between A and
Wi,A. There is something funny about this because coherence is supposed to pro-
vide evidence that the witnesses are indeed testifying to the truth. Recall that (No
Cred) is intended to capture the BonJour’s thought that individual claims prior to
coherence do not provide evidence; the evidence that the claims provide comes from
the coherence of the claims. To fill this out, let us examine two implications.
First, (No Cred) implies that learning that A occurs does not change one’s
credence that witness i testifies that A. That is, the following is true:
15I follow Olsson’s terminology. See (Olsson; 2017)
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(†) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A).16
(†) is to be expected when one lacks any knowledge about whether witness i
tracks A. If one’s prior credence in A is unmoved by a report that A then one ought
to think that independently learning A doesn’t change one’s credence that i reports
A. Similarly, if learning that A doesn’t change one’s prior credence that i reports
A then learning that i reports A doesn’t change one’s credence that A. Thus, (†)
implies that i’s report that A is like background noise with respect to A.
Second, (No Cred) implies one’s credence that i reports A is the same condi-
tional A or ¬A. That is,
(‡) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A | ¬A).17
A natural way to understand (‡) is that individual witness reports are not re-
sponsive at all to the relevant facts. Rather the relationship between the individual
reports and the relevant facts is the same as the relationship between individual flips
of a fair coin. Just as there is no evidential relationship between the 1st flip of a
fair coin and the 2nd flip of a fair coin, there is no evidential relationship between
i’s report that A occurred and A’s occurrence. This is an important consequence of
(No Cred) which I return to below.
Given (†) and (‡), Huemer’s theorem is easily proved.18 The crucial question,
though, is how we should understand the result. I turn to this question in the next
section.
2.3 Interpreting Huemer’s theorem
While the theorem is indisputable, its interpretation is not. The theorem is taken
to be bad news for coherentism. Huemer titles the section in which he proves the
theorem ‘Coherentism refuted.’19 After proving that the coherence of two testimonies
doesn’t change the probability of the content of the testimony, Huemer draws the
following lesson:
We see that if X receives no confirmation at all from either A or B indi-
vidually, then X receives no confirmation at all from A and B together. If
neither witness has any independent credibility, then the correspondence
16This is a well-known result but for the uninitiated see §6 in the appendix for a proof.




of the two witnesses’ testimony provides no reason at all for thinking that
what they report is true.20
This result, he claims, is not surprising because “it is highly counterintuitive
that one can manufacture confirmation of a hypothesis merely by combining a suf-
ficient number of pieces of evidence that are, individually, completely irrelevant to
the hypothesis.”21
Erik Olsson’s interpretation of this theorem coheres with Huemer’s. Olsson ex-
plains,
BonJour’s central argument for his coherence theory is manifestly false.
Contrary to what he thinks, coherence cannot generate credibility from
scratch when applied to independent data. Some reports must have a
degree of credibility that is prior to any consideration of coherence, or
such agreement will fail to have any effect whatsoever on the probability
of what is reported.22
Olsson takes the upshot of Huemer’s theorem to be that the BonJour’s central
coherentist intuition is provably false. As Olsson understands it, coherence generates
credibility only if the individual claims already have some degree of credibility.
In the rest of the paper I dispute Huemer’s and Olsson’s interpretation of the con-
sequences of this theorem. For the reasons I lay out in the next section the theorem
fails to undermine BonJour’s original intuition. The theorem specifies a mathemat-
ical relationship between individual items of evidence, the mass of evidence, and
target claim required for a boost of credence from a mass of evidence, viz., that such
a boost requires that the individual items of evidence are relevant. But that math-
ematical relationship doesn’t have the methodological lessons that are drawn from
it. At best, the theorem shows that a body of information cannot be both individu-
ally evidentially irrelevant and yet evidentially relevant upon reaching some critical
mass. The theorem specifies a necessary condition for coherence justification; but
the necessary condition has no implications regarding whether one’s credence must
first be moved by individual reports before being moved by the coherence of the
reports. All the theorem shows is that if coherence confirms then the individual re-
ports confirm. But that is a far cry from showing that coherentism is false. It could
be that upon learning that the mass of evidence is coherent, the individual claims





3 The power of coherence
It’s time for a story. Several years ago, there was a curious incident in my house.
My son, about two years old at the time, had a bedroom between my room and the
kitchen. In the middle of the night if I was peckish, I’d tiptoe through his room
dodging various objects in the room in hopes not to disturb a sleeping toddler. One
night, as I stealthily crossed his room, I saw a curious shadow. It could be a number
of things, but, on second look, nothing was there and so I dismissed it. A day later
my son was playing in his room and came out to say ‘snake’ or something like that in
toddler speech. As best I could make out, he was being playful and so we played with
legos for a while. A few days later my daughter around six years old at the time was
playing with my son and says ‘Oh, it’s a snake’. Now, my kids make-believe much
and it often focuses on animals. It’s entirely common to hear make-believe speech
like ‘Oh, it’s a shark’ or ‘Oh, it’s a horse’. So, in an isolated context, my six-year
old’s speech act isn’t evidentially relevant. But, in this particular context, when my
daughter said that, the three events all clicked and I began to give some credence
the possibility that a snake was in the house. If you’ve ever tried to find a snake in
a house, it’s not easy. Snakes don’t make noise and they prefer dark places that are
hard to reach. But the coherence of these reports made salient the chance that a
snake was in the house that a search commenced. After removing all the furniture
from my son’s room, a snake was found. The story ends well for all. The snake was
returned to the woods, my son’s room was safe for a toddler again, and I learned to
take more seriously shadows in the night and playful toddler speech.
The story illuminates a key point about the role of coherence: coherence can make
information evidentially relevant to a hypothesis when it is otherwise evidentially
irrelevant. Let’s reflect on the epistemology of this curious incident. The first item
of evidence, a1, is a perceptual experience that, by itself, lacks a clear upshot. My
prior credence that there was a snake in the house was unmoved by that experience.
Let S abbreviate that there’s a snake in the house. Then my credences were as
follows: c(S | a1) = c(S). Why think this? The experience was compatible with a
wide range of hypotheses most of which were non-serpentine hypotheses. Similarly,
for my toddler’s snake ‘report’, a2. His report of a snake lacked any indication that
there’s a snake in the house. If you doubt this, offer to babysit a few toddlers for
an evening while the parents get a needed evening out. So here to we have the
following: c(S | a2) = c(S). Finally, my six year old’s apparently make-believe
speech that there’s a snake a3 doesn’t move my prior credence that there’s a snake
in the house. As with the other items of evidence, it is unclear what exactly the
‘reports’ are reports of. As quote marks indicate, the intentional object of the report
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was unclear. Coherence often plays a role in interpreting speech. E.g., what did she
mean to say? She had to mean thus and so. The ‘had’ indicates an inference is being
made and that inference is supported by the rest of what we take to be true. So the
three reports were, in isolation from each other, not evidentially relevant.
But when the third event occurred, it became apparent that all three events
were, in fact, indications of a snake in the house. The coherence of the reports led
to a realization that the events were indeed evidentially relevant to the presence of a
snake in the house. It’s natural to describe the change as follows. By themselves the
reports were not evidentially relevant but the coherence of the reports showed that
they were evidentially relevant. The coherence of the report changed their individual
evidential role. Once I saw that the three reports were indications of a snake, the
individual reports then had power to move my prior credence.23
I take it for granted that each item of evidence is determinate. In each case there
is an item of evidence whose significance can be interpreted in a number of ways.
Coherence fixes an interpretation which boosts the probability of the serpentine
hypothesis. A different way coherence can confirm a hypothesis is when it is unclear
what the evidence is. This latter way conflicts with Bayesian models which assume
that the evidence is determinate.
In this story the evidential relevance of the information changes after learning
that the information is coherent. Prior to learning that the evidence is coherent, my
credence function includes (‡), that is c(ai | S) = c(ai | ¬S). But after learning that
the evidence is coherent, my credence function changes so that c(ai | S) > c(ai | ¬S).
The coherence of the reports leads to the realization that the individual reports are
indeed indications of the relevant fact. Thus, Olsson’s remark that “Some reports
must have a degree of credibility that is prior to any consideration of coherence, or
such agreement will fail to have any effect whatsoever on the probability of what
is reported”24 is not sensitive to the way that coherence can change the evidential
relevance of information. Similarly, Huemer’s remark one cannot manufacture con-
firmation by combining individually irrelevant information does not hit the intended
mark. It is correct that irrelevant information doesn’t magically become relevant in
sufficient mass. But it’s wrong that the coherence of otherwise irrelevant information
has no effect; in fact, it can lead to the realization that the information is indeed
relevant.
23There is a parallel here in ancient legal tradition. In the Hebrew Scriptures, a conviction cannot
be secured on a single witness report; convictions require multiple witness reports. Cf. Deuteronomy
19:15 “One witness is not enough to convict anyone accused of any crime or offense they may have
committed. A matter must be established by the testimony of two or three witnesses.”
24Olsson (2005, 69).
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So, what is wrong with Huemer’s interpretation of BonJour’s intuition? Huemer
is correct that (No Cred) appears to characterize the idea that one’s credence is
unmoved by an individual report. But the error is that (No Cred) is treated as a
constraint on a probabilistic model according to which it must characterize a subject’s
credence at all times, both before learning that the information is coherent and after
learning that the information is coherent. But if coherence has the power to change
evidential relevance then (No Cred) shouldn’t be understood as a constraint on a
probabilistic model. Rather it should be taken as a feature of a credence function at
a time which new information may overturn.
The variability of evidential relevance fits with BonJour’s original intuition. In
the passage quoted above note the significance BonJour places on the way coherence
can ‘evidentially dictate the hypothesis of truth-telling as the available explanation
of their agreement.’25 If we take (No Cred) as a constraint on probabilistic models
then we lose the ability to come to see that the individual reports are indeed respon-
sive to the truth, i.e., we lose the ability to capture the correct conclusion that the
individuals are telling the truth. When we come to the conclusion post-coherence
that the individuals are reporting the truth then we take their individual testimony
to be evidence for the relevant claim. It’s no longer true that the individual reports
are like background noise with respect to the relevant claim. Coherence turns what
is otherwise noise into a harmony of individual voices.
When presenting this story and my epistemic analysis of it, I have been greeted
with two responses: a coherence friendly response and a coherence hostile response.
The friendly response agrees that one’s rational credence may be unmoved by the
individual reports prior to learning that the information is coherent and that after
learning the evidence is coherent one’s credence is moved by the individual reports.
The hostile response has focused on pushing back on the idea that rational credence is
unmoved by the individual reports prior to learning that the information is coherent.
It is pointed out that, for example, an ideal Bayesian reasoner may be moved ever
so slightly to the serpentine hypothesis by playful toddler speak.
I have two responses to this line of thought. First, while an ideal Bayesian
reasoner may be so moved ever so slightly, the anti-coherence response requires that
a rational Bayesian reasoner must be so moved. The purpose of this paper is to show
that this is false; there are Bayesian models that capture this dynamic and cohere
with the story I want to tell in this section. Second, it may be possible to use the
recent literature on imprecise credences to model the story I tell in this section. In
this case what happens is that one has imprecise credences on the relevant priors and
likelihoods in the story and then when one learns that the evidence is coherent, those
25BonJour (1985, 145).
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imprecise probabilities become precise and thus support the serpentine hypothesis.26
4 Coherence and witness reliability
The idea that coherence can change the evidential relevance of information is similar
to the idea that coherence can change one’s credence in the reliability of a source of
information. Erik Olsson has pursued this latter idea in connection with a criticism
of Huemer’s model of coherence justification. Huemer’s model does not include
different hypotheses about witness reliability which is crucial for both Lewis’s and
BonJour’s intuitions about the case. As both Lewis and BonJour see it, the surprising
agreement of witness testimonies increases one’s credence that they are speaking the
truth. Olsson builds a coherence model that incorporates different hypotheses about
witness reliability and then proves that coherence does not increase credence apart
from individual reports increasing credence. In the following I explain Olsson’s result
and situate my approach to coherence justification in the context of a Lewis model.
4.1 Olsson on Lewis models
In Lewis’s case there are two hypotheses concerning the witnesses; either the wit-
nesses are perfectly reliable or the witnesses randomly generate their reports. The
fact that witnesses report the same event is surprising on the assumption that they
randomly generate their reports. This surprising fact, it is claimed, lends credence
to the reliability hypothesis. Olsson proves that even in this setup the surprising
fact of coherence does not increase the probability that the reports are true apart
from the reports possessing some individual credibility. Let us review this result and
discuss its significance.
4.1.1 Initial setup
Consider the following scenario in which there are two groups of witnesses to a
crime.27 One group is far away and another group is near by. We do not know
which group any given witness belongs to. What we do know is that the nearby
witnesses are perfectly reliable and the faraway witnesses are perfectly unreliable
(i.e., their reports are generated randomly). Let’s take two witnesses Jones and
26I lack space to develop this further. I hope to return to it in a future paper. Thanks to Julia
Staffel for this suggestion. For some recent literature on imprecise credences see Rinard (2017);
Schoenfield (2017); Builes et al. (forthcoming)
27The following paragraphs follow Olsson’s discussion closely.
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Smith. Consider these two hypotheses which we stipulate are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive:
(R) Jones and Smith are completely reliable.
(U) Jones and Smith are completely unreliable.
Consider the proposition (F) = Forbes is the culprit. Let Ej,F indicate that Jones
says that Forbes in the culprit and let Es,F indicate that Smith says that Forbes is
the culprit.
Given our assumption that reliable witnesses are perfectly reliable, the following
claims are true.
(i) P (Ej,F | F ∧R) = 1 = P (Es,F | F ∧R).
(ii) P (Ej,F | ¬F ∧R) = 0 = P (Es,F | ¬F ∧R).
For agreement to be surprising we stipulate that there are many more witnesses
further from the scene of the crime than close to the scene. We also stipulate that
if the witnesses are unreliable then they generate a report that Forbes did it with
the same probability that Forbes is the actual culprit. So we have the following two
claims.
(iii) P (Ej,F | F ∧ U) = P (F ) = P (Es,F | F ∧ U).
(iv) P (Ej,F | ¬F ∧ U) = P (F ) = P (Es,F | ¬F ∧ U).
If, for instance, there are n suspects and exactly one of the suspects committed the
crime then, on the assumption of unreliability, the probability that Jones identifies
Forbes as the culprit is 1
n
. This probability is the same regardless of whether Forbes
is the actual culprit.
Next we introduce the independence assumptions. If they are reliable then this
is trivially satisfied on account of the fact that the witnesses are perfectly reliable.
That is,
P (Ej,F | F ∧R) = 1 = P (Ej,F | F ∧R ∧ Es,F ).28
28Mutatis mutandis, for each witness.
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We need to specify that the witnesses are conditionally independent on the as-
sumption that they are both unreliable. The following accomplish this.
(v) P (Ej,F | F ∧ U ∧ Es,F ) = P (Ej,F | F ∧ U)
(vi) P (Ej,F | ¬F ∧ U ∧ Es,F ) = P (Ej,F | ¬F ∧ U)
Then we stipulate that the reliability profiles of the witnesses are independent of
the guilt or innocence of Forbes.
(vii) P (R | F ) = P (R) = P (R | ¬F )
(viii) P (U | F ) = P (U) = P (U | ¬F )
4.1.2 Coherence in a Lewis model
We are now in a position to determine the probability that Forbes is the culprit given
coherent testimonies. By Bayes’s theorem,
P (F | Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) = P (Ej,F∧Es,F |F )×P (F )P (Ej,F∧Es,F )
We determine the right-hand side as follows. First, start with the evidence that
we have two concurring testimonies. By the theorem of total probability and our
setup we have this:
P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) = P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | R)P (R) + P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | U)P (U)
Given our assumptions, this is equivalent to the following.
P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) = P (F )P (R) + P (F )2P (U).
The next quantity to determine is the probability of the evidence given Forbes’s
guilt. We expand this using the theorem of total probability for conditional proba-
bility.
P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | F ) =
P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | R ∧ F )P (R | F ) + P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | U ∧ F )P (U | F )
Given our assumptions, this we get the following:
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P (Ej,F ∧ Es,F | F ) = P (R) + P (F )2Pr(U)
So, plugging these expressions into Bayes’s theorem and cancelling P (F ) in the
numerator and denominator, gives us:
P (F | Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) = P (R)+P (F )
2Pr(U)
P (R)+P (F )P (U)
We’ve assumed that R and U are exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses concerning
the reliability profiles of Jones and Smith. We can thus see by simple algebra that,
if P(U)=1 then
P (F | Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) = P (F ).
This result is not surprising. If we know that both witnesses are randomizers
then their reports have no evidential value and so the prior of Forbes’s guilt is
unchanged. Moreover, the concurring testimonies increases the probability of F only
if P (U) < 1.29 Putting this together, in a Lewis model, concurring testimonies
confirm F if and only if P (U) < 1.
Now we can show that if P (U) < 1 and 0 < P (F ) < 1 then P (F | Ej,S) > P (F ).
This result proves that increase in credence provided by concurring witness testi-
monies under the above conditions requires that the individual testimonies provide
confirmation.
Given the set up, P (F | Ej,S) = P (R) + P (F )P (U).30 Given that R and U are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses concerning reliability, we can express
this as follows: P (F | Ej,S) = (1− P (U)) + P (F )P (U). Suppose that P (F | Ej,S) =
P (F ) and that P (F ) < 1. Then we have the following:
(1− P (U)) + P (F )P (U) = P (F )
iff (1− P (U)) = P (F )− P (F )P (U)
iff (1− P (U)) = P (F )(1− P (U))
If (1 − P (U)) > 0 then we divide both sides by (1 − P (U) to reach P (F ) = 1
which contradicts our stipulation that P (F ) < 1. So (1− P (U) = 0 and P (U) = 1.
The upshot is this. If we assume that the testimonies are individually evidentially
irrelevant, that is P (F | Ej,S) = P (F ) = P (F | Es,F ) and it’s not certain that Forbes
29See appendix §11 for a proof.
30See appendix §10 for a proof.
16
is guilty then P (U) = 1. In this case, there is no change in credence from concurring
testimonies. Conversely, if there is a change in credence from concurring testimonies
then there is a change in credence from the individual testimonies. In a Lewis model,
coherence increases the probability of a claim only if the individual reports increase
probability.
4.2 Lewis models & coherence justification
The Lewis model of coherence justification illustrates the interplay between hypothe-
ses about witness reliability and coherence justification. The model shows that co-
herence is a source of confirmation if and only if the individual evidence is a source
of confirmation. If a subject’s credences are unmoved by individual reports then
the Lewis model shows their credence in unreliability must be 1. In this case my
approach to coherence justification requires that once one learns that the evidence
is coherent one’s credence changes so that the hypothesis of reliability receives some
positive credence and hence the evidence becomes individually relevant. This view
is not as radical as may first seem for it is supported by clear intuition and relates
to standing difficulties with Bayesian updating.
Let’s start with the clear intuition. Often in the context of reasoning, we take
for granted some statements. When my spouse asks me to pick up our daughter
from ballet, I take for granted that she is not intentionally misleading me about our
daughter being at ballet. Consider a probabilistic example. I take a coin at random
from a jar of change I’ve collected. The coin looks to be perfectly normal currency.
I take it for granted that the coin is fair. That is, it is simply not up for short run
empirical verification that the coin has some bias. So each flip of the coin is taken
to be probabilistically independent of the other flips. But suppose that after flipping
the coin for 1000 times we get 723 heads. This is overwhelming evidence for a bias.
But note that if it is taken for granted that the coin is fair then there’s no way by
Bayesian updating to get the right intuition that 723 heads out of 1000 flips provides
strong evidence for a bias without each individual flip providing some small bit of
evidence that the coin isn’t fair. The proof here runs exactly parallel to the witness
reliability model in Olsson. What happens in the coin flipping case is that after a
long sequence of flips, the mass of evidence calls for a reevaluation of what is taken
for granted, viz., the coin is fair.
The coin case and the coherence case can be treated alike by finding a Bayesian
model for assumptions. In the following I’ll treat an assumption as having credence
1.31 As is well known if one’s credal state includes assigning unit probability to
31This can be modeled in Titelbaum’s Certainty Loss Framework (see Titelbaum (2013)). Titel-
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some empirical claim then one cannot acquire new evidence such that by Bayesian
updating one comes to have less than complete confidence in that empirical claim.
This is a problematic feature with Bayesian models because there are cases in which
empirical discoveries (e.g., the curvature of space-time) rationally leads one to revise
entrenched assumptions (e.g., that light travels in a straight line).
This is not news for the Bayesian. The core problem is that if one’s credence
function is mistaken in any number of ways then the rule of conditionalization up-
dates probabilities in accord with the mistakes. To solve this problem it requires
replacing the rule of conditionalization with a different rule for updating probabil-
ities. Christopher Meacham (2016) discusses this problem and proposes a different
rule that updates in accord with ur-priors. Let us consider Meacham’s proposal and
how it may be applied to coherence reasoning.32
Bayesianism is characterized by two core commitments: probabilism and con-
ditionalization. Probabilism specifies that one’s degrees of belief (one’s credences)
should satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. Conditionalization specifies that
when a subject acquires new evidence, E, her degree of belief, say in p, should change
to what her old degree of belief in p is conditional on E. Thus, if cre−(p) = n then,
upon learning E, one’s new credence cre+(p) = cre−(p | e). Conditionalization is
often taken to be the only way one’s credence changes over time. Bayesianism then
offers the following counsel: start with initial credences that satisfy the axioms of
probability and then change credences by updating on new information in light of
those initial credences.
Meacham reviews standard complaints with conditionalization. Let’s consider
three. One complaint is that conditionalization doesn’t properly handle cases in
which a subject has updated incorrectly.33 Suppose a subject at t0 has credences
cr0 and then acquires new evidence e1 at t1. She then updates on this evidence
incorrectly. She assigns cr1(·) 6= cr0(· | e1). She then acquires some new evidence
e2 at t2. What should her new credences be? If she follows conditionalization then
her new credences should be cr2 = cr1(· | e2). But this doesn’t seem correct because
cr1 encodes a mistake. A better approach is to first correct the error in cr1 and
then update accordingly. But, as Meacham argues, there’s no understanding of
conditionalization that allows for this.
baum provides a Bayesian model that allows for claims to go from a credence of 1 to a credence
less than 1. My proposal is to extend this to the role of assumptions.
32The discussion here provides a way of capturing coherence reasoning within a commitment to
precise credences. The literature on imprecise credences may provide another way that doesn’t
require ur-prior conditionalization.
33See Meacham (2016, 449-51).
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A second complaint is that conditionalization doesn’t properly handle changes
in one’s views about the relevant merits of the theoretical virtues.34 Following
Meacham, consider two theories T1 and T2 both compatible with the available ev-
idence. Suppose that T1 better satisfies some theoretical virtues, while T2 satisfies
other theoretical virtues. Suppose one starts off thinking that T1 is more plausible on
account of the fact that one thinks the virtues that T1 satisfies are more important.
Accordingly one’s credence in the first theory is higher than one’s credence in the
second. But then suppose that on reflection one comes to switch one’s view about the
relative importance of the theoretical virtues. In this case conditionalization cannot
capture this change in credence because it’s not a case of updating on new evidence;
rather it’s a case of changing one’s beliefs about the theoretical virtues. In this case
change in credence requires changing in accord with a new credence function that
mirrors one’s new beliefs about the theoretical virtues.
A third complaint about conditionalization is that it cannot handle cases in which
one learns about a new theory.35 Suppose there are exactly three theories, T1, T2, and
T3 that could explain some evidence E. One has never conceived of T3. Yet when
E occurs, one puzzles over it and comes to realize for the first time that a hitherto
unknown theory T3 would explain E. One then comes to think that T1 ∨ T2 is less
plausible given E. The trouble is that conditionalization cannot capture this change
of belief. The reason is that prior to learning E one had the following credence:
c(T1 ∨ T2 | E) = 1.
Meacham observes that one may respond that conditionalization is intended to
describe ideal subjects. But Meacham points out that being unaware of a theory
doesn’t imply that one violates probabilism or conditionalization per se. But if we
do take this to be a case for non-ideal subjects then it becomes a case of error
correction.36
Meacham’s solution to each problematic case is to appeal to ur-prior condition-
alization. The core idea is that each change—error correction, change in theoreti-
cal virtues, or learning about new theories—is modeled as changing one’s existing
credence function to a credence function that represents ‘ur-priors.’ Meacham con-
siders three different ways of understanding an ur-prior function: a subject’s initial
credences, a function that bears the right relations to a subject’s credences and ev-
idence over time, and a function that represents a subject’s evidential standards.37
I’ll work with the last option; the ur-prior function represents a subject’s evidential






Let us consider briefly how ur-prior conditionalization answers the above prob-
lems. We start with the idea that ur-prior conditionalization requires a move from
one’s existing credence function c to a new credence function c′ that more accurately
reflects the subject’s evidential standards.38 In the case of error correction, upon
learning e2 one ought to change to a credence function that corrects for the earlier
mistake in updating. In the case of changing theoretical virtues one’s credence func-
tion changes to reflect the new evaluation of the priors for theories. In the case of
learning about new theories, when one learns E and realizes that T3 would explain
E, one’s credence function ought to change so that c′(T1 ∨ T2) < 1.
Ur-prior conditionalization can be invoked to model the way coherence may ra-
tionally change a subject’s confidence in some claim. We’ve seen that in a Lewis
witness model the following claims are true: (i) if one’s credence that the witnesses
are unreliable is less than certain then individual witness reports have some credibil-
ity and (ii) if the individual witness reports have no effect on the content then one
is certain that the witnesses are unreliable. Olsson claims this is a formal refuta-
tion of BonJour’s intuition that coherence can confirm even if the evidence does not
individually confirm. An appeal to ur-prior conditionalization can make BonJour’s
intuition compatible with Olsson’s discussion on Lewis models.
Let us begin by introducing a new atomic sentence ‘C’ which states that the
evidence is coherent. When one acquires multiple lines of testimony to the same
event, one thereby learns C. Let’s suppose that prior to learning C, one’s credence
function includes that the reports are randomly generated. In terms of Lewis’s model,
this amounts to crC−(U) = 1 or in terms of Huemer’s original model it amounts to
(No Cred). However, upon learning C one is rationally moved to a new credence
function on which crC+(U) < 1 or that (No Cred) is false. Once one learns that C,
the evidential standards counsel a change in credence function to a ur-prior function
on which one has a non-zero credence that the reports are of the relevant fact.39
This illustrates how learning C has significant epistemic upshot while also grant-
ing that the impossibility result shows that individual credibility is a necessary condi-
tion for coherence justification. Coherence rationally leads one to revise the evidential
significance of individual pieces of evidence. We can then revise BonJour’s formal
intuition to get a statement consistent with the impossibility result. Huemer and
Olsson formulated BonJour’s intuition thusly:
38These standards can be constrained by normative requirements. I ignore this extra complica-
tion.
39This does require that ur-priors are not regular, that is, that one may have unit credence to a
non-logical truth.
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BonJour’s Formal Intuition: It is possible that c(A | Wi,A ∧Wj,A) >
c(A) even if (i) c(A | Wi,A) = c(A), (ii) c(A | Wj,A) = c(A), and (ii) the
reports are conditionally independent.
We can appeal to a change in credence function and to the idea of learning C to
get this:
BonJour’s Formal Intuition (revised): It is possible that crC+(A |
Wi,A∧Wj,A) > crC+(A) even if (i) crC−(A | Wi,A) = crC−(A), (ii) crC−(A |
Wj,A) = crC−(A), and (ii) the reports are conditionally independent.
BonJour’s formal intuition thus revised recognizes that learning that C has sig-
nificant epistemic effect. It changes one’s credence function from one in which the
evidence has no confirmatory effect to one on which the evidence does have confirma-
tory effect. In the end this should not come as a surprise; for the power of coherence
lies in it showing that the individual items of evidence are indeed indicative of reality.
5 A Garber inspired model of coherence
We have seen that coherence may function to change the evidential relevance of
individual evidence. It turns out that we can develop this idea to secure confirmation
by coherence without ur-prior conditionalization. The move is to introduce an atomic
sentence ‘C’ that represents that ‘the evidence is coherent’. This move parallels
Garber’s Bayesian solution to the problem of old evidence which involves introducing
as an atomic sentence the relevant logical fact that is learned.40 This Garber-styled
model also avoids a deeper problem with coherence proved by Huemer in 2011. This
is the problem of negative coherence justification. I’ll begin with an explanation of
this problem and then move to the Garber inspired model of coherence.41
5.1 Confirmation by negative coherence
Huemer’s latest paper on coherence proves a theorem that minimal commitments
about the role of coherence imply the surprising result that negative coherence pro-
vides confirmation. The theorem is as follows:
40See Garber (1983)
41Thanks to Branden Fitelson for the suggestion to pursue a Garber inspired model of coherence.
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cr(H | E1) = cr(H | E2) = cr(H) & cr(H | E1 ∧ E2) > cr(H) =⇒
cr(H | ¬E1 ∧ ¬E2) > cr(H).42
The theorem says that if the evidence has no individual credibility and yet the ev-
idence is relevant in mass then the falsity of the evidence confirms H. Here’s the basic
idea. The individual evidence is probabilistically independent of H. Baby logic im-
plies that e1 = (e1&e2)∨ (e1&¬e2). Since e1 is independent of H, (e1&e2)∨ (e1&¬e2)
is probabilistically independent of H. But by confirmation by coherence the first
disjunct increases the probability of H, so the second disjunct decreases the proba-
bility H. Since e2 is independent of H so is ¬e2. But ¬e2 = (¬e2&e1) ∨ (¬e2&¬e1).
We’ve just seen that the first disjunct must lower the probability of H, so the second
disjunct must raise the probability of H.
This is a surprising result. It is driven by the assumption of no-individual credi-
bility. If coherence functions to change the evidential relevance of the evidence then
this theorem isn’t relevant for the coherentist. Both the appeal to ur-prior condi-
tionalization and the model below avoid the problem of negative coherence.
5.2 Learning about coherence
Recall BonJour’s core coherentist intuition is that isolated evidence does not confir-
mation but coherent evidence does confirm. When one learns that an isolated item
of evidence is true, one learns something logically stronger than just e1; one learns
that e1 is true and that the evidence is not coherent. That is, one learns e1&¬C.
When one acquires multiple items of evidence that cohere with each other, one learns
not only that e1&e2 but also one learns C.
We can then represent BonJour’s claim that isolated evidence offers no confir-
mation as this: P (H | ei&¬C) = P (H). Then coherence justification requires the
following: P (H | ei&ej&C) > P (H). We can also add a condition that negative
coherence confirmation is false. This yields: P (H | ¬e1 ∧ ¬e2 ∧ ¬C) < P (H). We
then add conditional independence as before.
Confirmation by coherence is possible if the following conditions hold.
1. cr(H | e1 ∧ ¬C) = cr(H)
2. cr(H | e2 ∧ ¬C) = cr(H)
3. cr(e1 | e2 ∧H) = cr(e1 | H)
42Huemer (2011)
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4. cr(e2 | e1 ∧H) = cr(e2 | H)
5. cr(e1 | e2 ∧ ¬H) = cr(e1 | ¬H)
6. cr(e2 | e1 ∧ ¬H) = cr(e2 | ¬H)
7. cr(H | e1 ∧ e2 ∧ C) > cr(H)
8. cr(H | ¬e1 ∧ ¬e2 ∧ ¬C) < cr(H)
The first two conditions capture no individual credibility formulated with the
additional sentence ¬C representing that when learns a single item of evidence and
that it is not coherent with other evidence then one’s credence in the target claim
is unmoved. Conditions 3-6, as before in the earlier discussions of coherence, specify
that the evidence is conditionally independent, Condition 7 specifies confirmation
by coherence. Given the individual evidence and its coherence, one’s credence in
the target claim is increased. But condition 8 specifies that negative coherence
confirmation is avoided. Given the individual evidence is false and that it is not
coherent, one’s credence in the target claim is reduced.
PrSat returns a model for these conditions.43
E1 E2 H C var Pr
T T T T a1
10
43
T T T F a2
1
63
T T F T a3
1
185
T T F F a4
1
111
T F T T a5
2
15
T F T F a6
3
26
T F F T a7
3
25
T F F F a8 0.122249
F T T T a9 0.000423625
F T T F a10
1
999
F T F T a11 0.005801
F T F F a12 0.00786501
F F T T a13
1
999
F F T F a14 0.000425269
F F F T a15 0.00147749
F F F F a16 0.228193
43For a discussion of PrSaT with applications see Fitelson (2008).
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The crucial result demonstrates that coherence justification is possible under the
conditions of no individual credibility and coherence justification. It shows that for
an interpretation of C and for a probability function, it can be the case that a mass
of coherent evidence can increase credence under conditions that capture BonJour’s
original intuition. The upshot is that the formal results have not closed the door on
the possibility of coherence. Moreover, this model is one in which the problem of
negative coherence justification is avoided.
This model upholds the intuitive conditions of no-individual credibility and con-
ditional intuition. Huemer’s 2011 article ‘Does probability theory refute coherence?’
attempts to secure confirmation by coherence by replacing both no-individual cred-
ibility and conditional independence with different probabilistic conditions.44 Erik
Olsson comments on this move:
Whatever merits Huemer’s new conditions might have, their standing
in the literature is hardly comparable to that of the original conditions.
Conditional Independence, for instance, is an extremely powerful and
intuitive concept which has been put to fruitful use in many areas in
philosophy and computer science, the most spectacular example being
the theory of Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988). Similarly, the Nonfounda-
tionalist condition [i.e., no-individual credibility] is still the most widely
used—and many would say most natural—way of stating, in the lan-
guage of probability theory, that a testimony fails to support that which
is testified. Thus, it would seem that coherentism is saved at the price of
disconnecting it from the way in which probability theory is standardly
applied.45
A primary virtue of the approach I’ve articulated in this essay is to maintain the
connection between coherentism and probability theory.
There are two natural questions about this model of coherentist justification.
First, does the new characterization of no-individual credibility combined with condi-
tional independence imply coherence justification? That is, do the first six conditions
imply the 7th (i.e., coherence justification)? They do not. PrSaT returns a model
on which the first six conditions are true and there is a decrease in the credence of
H given C and e1 and e2.46 There are models of the first six conditions in which
cr(H | e1 ∧ e2 ∧ C) > cr(H) is true, models in which cr(H | e1 ∧ e2 ∧ C) = cr(H) is
true, and models in which cr(H | e1 ∧ e2 ∧ C) < cr(H) is true.
44For details see Huemer (2011, 41–44).
45Olsson (2017).
46See Appendix 12 for a model.
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Second, how we should understand C? For the purposes of the model C is an
uninterpreted constant formally defined in terms of conditions 1, 2, 7, & 8. We
can further specify a probabilistic content to C in terms of the condition: cr(C |
e1 ∧ e2) > cr(C | ¬e1 ∨¬e2). This specifies that it is more likely that the evidence is
coherent given the truth of the evidence than give its falsity. Adding this condition
to the above eight conditions, yields the following model in PrSat.
E1 E2 H C var Pr
T T T T a1
9
41
T T T F a2
3
68
T T F T a3
7
43
T T F F a4
1
473
T F T T a5
4
51
T F T F a6
4
37
T F F T a7
3
86
T F F F a8 0.150112
F T T T a9 0.00101301
F T T F a10
2
71
F T F T a11 0.000568227
F T F F a12 0.0701725
F F T T a13
1
999
F F T F a14 0.0196476
F F F T a15 0.00179977
F F F F a16 0.0775593
What should we think of this result? As commented above it secures the desider-
ata for coherentist justification, but it does have some odd features. The model
treats C as logically independent from e1 and e2. See for instance rows 1 and 2.
The model permits every truth-functional combination of C with the other variables
in the model, subject to the explicit conditions explained above. I’ve attempted to
impose further conditions on the model that rules out, for instance, cases in which
C is true while e1 and e2 are false, but PrSat does not return a model when that is
added in. It is area of further research to find other probabilistic conditions that may
fit better with an intuitive understanding of C. But whether or not that is so, if we
understand coherence in terms of explanatory relations that are not modeled truth-
functionally we can make sense of this model. In the case of row 2, there would be
no explanatory relationships between the evidence and hypothesis. Similar remarks
hold for the other rows. Thus we have a formal probabilistic model of coherentist
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justification that can be embedded within an explanatory coherentist epistemology.47
6 Conclusion
I’ve argued that the formal results on the role of coherence fail to have their intended
epistemic upshot. It is compatible with the former results that the individual credi-
bility of the evidence changes in response to facts about coherence. Moreover, I have
provided a Bayesian model that shows how learning that the evidence is coherence
can be evidentially relevant. The core flaw in interpreting the formal results is to
think that coherence has power only if the individual evidence first has power. The
formal results are taken to show that coherence is always the cart being pulled by
the horse of individual credibility. But the friend of coherence sees that coherence
may be the horse pulling the cart of individual credibility.
47See Lehrer (1974, 2000); BonJour (1985); Poston (2014)
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Appendices
7 Proof of †
(†)P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A)
Proof
P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒
P (A)× P (Wi,A | A)
P (Wi,A)
= P (A) (Bayes’s theorem)
P (Wi,A | A)
P (Wi,A)
= 1 (divide by P(A))
P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A)
8 Proof of ‡
(‡)P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A | ¬A)
Proof
P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A) (†)
a = P (Wi,A | A)P (A) + P (Wi,A | ¬A)P (¬A)
a = ah + c(1− h)
a− ah = c(1− h)
a(1− h) = c(1− h)
a = c
9 Proof of Huemer’s theorem
Let P (A) = 1
n
. (No Cred) implies P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A | ¬A) = k. Let each
witness as being equally reliable. Then we have the following
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Proof
P (Wi,A ∧Wj,A) =














This proof demonstrates that the evidence that both i and j report A is, given
conditional independence and (No Cred), equal to the rate of reliability squared.
Huemer’s theorem then follows from this given Bayes’s theorem.
Proof
P (A | Wi,A ∧Wj,A)
=











10 Lewis models - negative result
I first prove that P (F | Ej,F ) = P (R)+P (F )P (U). Then I prove that P (F | Ej,F ) =
P (F | Es,F ) = P (F ) only if P(U)=1.
Proof
P (F | Ej,F )
= P (Ej,F | F ∧R)P (R | F ) + P (Ej,F | F ∧ U)P (U | F )
= P (R) + P (F )P (U)
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Proof
P (F | Ej,F ) = P (F )
iff P (R) + P (F )P (U) = P (F ) (by previous result)
iff P (R) = P (F )− P (F )P (U)
iff P (R) = P (F )(1− P (U))
iff P (R) = P (F )P (R) by reliability assumptions
iff P (F ) = 1. if P(R)=0 then this reductio is blocked
11 Result
Prove that P (F | Ej,F ∧ Es,F ) > P (F | Ej,F ) only if P (U) < 1.
By previous results and substitution, we need to prove that a+b
2c
a+bc
> a + bc only




> a + bc
iff a + b2c > a2 + 2abc + b2c2
iff (1− c) + b2c > (1− c)2 + 2bc(1− c) + b2c2
iff 1− c + b2c > 1 + c2 − 2c + 2bc− 2bc2 + b2c2
iff c(b2 − 1) > c(c− 2 + 2b− 2bc + b2c)
iff (b2 − 1) > c− 2 + 2b− 2bc + b2c
iff (b2 + 1) > c + 2b− 2bc + b2c
iff 1 + b2 − 2b > c− 2bc + b2c
iff 1 + b2 − 2b > c(1 + b2 − 2b)
iff c < 1.
29
12 Conditions 1-6 do not imply 7
E1 E2 H H1 var Pr
T T T T a16
1
174
T T T F a12
9
41
T T F T a13
3
13
T T F F a6
6
29
T F T T a14
5
38
T F T F a7
1
999
T F F T a8
1
79
T F F F a2 0.0136166
F T T T a15 0.0884748
F T T F a9
1
985
F T F T a10 0.0203863
F T F F a3 0.0136309
F F T T a11
1
112
F F T F a4 0.0437422
F F F T a5 0.00145686
F F F F a1 0.00058533
30
References
BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge, Harvard University Press.
Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University
Press.
Builes, D., Horowitz, S. and Schoenfield, M. (forthcoming). Dilating and contracting
arbitrarily, Noûs .
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